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RECENT DECISIONS
CORPORATIONS-PREFERRED

STOCKOLDERS

AS CREDITORS-REDEMPTION

AGREE-

1919 plaintiff paid defendant corporation $1,000 for a certificate of
ten shares of preferred stock. Prior to the purchase plaintiff was told by the
officers of defendant and it was so stated on the certificate, that the stock would
pay 7% per annum, that the dividends were guaranteed, that the stock would
be redeemed in full in 1929, and that the stock would constitute a preferred
claim on the assets of the company. In 1929, in conformity with the terms of the
c-ertificate, plaintiff gave notice to the defendant that he desired to have his stock
redeemed and all "interest" thereon paid. The defendant, though solvent, refused
to redeem and pay up the "interest." Action to reduce plaintiff's alleged claim
to judgment, which would constitute a preferred lien on the assets of defendant, and to foreclose such lien. Demurrer by defendant sustained, and judgment
given against plaintiff upon his refusal to plead further; plaintiff appeals. Held,
that the complaint states a cause of action to have the stock redeemed. Judgment
reversed with instructions to overrule the demurrer. Cring v. Sheller Wood Rim
Mfg. Co., (Ind. 1932) 183 N.E. 674.
Plaintiff was a stockholder of defendant company and not a creditor. Spencer
v. Smith, 201 Fed. 647 (C.C.A. 8th, 1912) ; Warren v. Queen & Co., 240 Pa. 154,
87 A. 595 (1913). The purchase of stock is not a loan to the company. Warren v.
Queen & Co., supra; Booth v. Union Fibre Co., 142 Minn. 127, 171 N.W. 307
(1919). A preferred stockholder is entitled to have his stock redeemed at maturity if the company is solvent, so that redemption can be done without preju
dice to the rights of creditors. 14 C.J. 507; 7 R.C.L. § 171, p. 201; Koeppler v.
Crocker Chair Co., 200 Wis. 476, 228 N.W. 130 (1930) ; Westerfield-Bonte Co. v.
Burnett, 176 Ky. 188, 195 S.W. 477 (1917). The burden is on the stockholder to
show that the company is solvent and that redemption can be made without
prejudice to the rights of creditors. Koeppler v. Crocker Chair Co., supra. Even
where corporate creditors surrender notes of the company and receive preferred
stock in lieu thereof, they cease to be creditors, and in respect to the remaining
creditors of the company occupy the position of stockholders. National Electric
Signaling Co. v. Fessenden, 207 Fed. 915 (C.C.A. 1st, 1913); Warren v. King,
108 U.S. 389 (1883). Even though the certificate of preferred stock says that
"the holder of this certificate shall have a preferred lien on the assets of the
corporation," no such lien attaches, the preferred stockholder getting at most a
preferene over common stockholders in case of liquidation. Weaver Power Co.
v. Elk Mountain Mill Co., 154 N.C. 76, 69 S.E. 747 (1910). "Any attempt to give
preferred stock any preference, either in respect of payment of principal or
dividends which will be superior to the rights of creditors, unless by virtue of
express statutory authority, . . . is contrary to public policy and void." Koeppler
v. Crocker Chair Co., supra at 481. However, the courts generally construe such
certificates as merely giving the right to redemption when the company is solvent,
can pay all outstanding debts, and when such redemption will not in any way
harm creditors. Koeppler v. Crocker Chair Co., supra; Warren v. Queen & Co.,
supra; Westerfield-Bonte Co. v. Burnett, supra.
BIENTS.-In

Although the ruling in the instant case is well-settled law, the public is constantly being misled by the inducements in the certificates, which indicate an
apparently fool-proof investment. Owen, J.,concurring in Koeppler v. Crocker
Chair Co., supra at 484, says: "Such an agreement in a stock certificate is a
trap and a snare for the unwary investor. He is deluded into the belief that
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he has a contract and that he has acquired contract rights. It were better public
policy to prohibit entirely the issuance of such contracts. * * * I suggest that
the matter may well receive the serious consideration of the legislature."
VINCENT

T.

HARTNETT

EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS-RESTRAINT OF TRADE-INJUNCTIONS. - Defendant
had been employed as driver of the plaintiff's wagon, collecting and delivering
towels on one of the plaintiff's routes for eleven years. In 1930 he was made
route foreman, and thereupon he entered into a contract with the plaintiff
whereby the latter agreed to pay him a stated wage, and the defendant agreed
that he would not within two years after leaving plaintiff's employ in any way
carry on a similar business with the plaintiff's customers. The contract could be
terminated by either party by a two weeks' notice. In 1932 the defendant was
discharged. He sought employment elsewhere, but was unable to find it.' Because
of a physical disability, his appearance made it quite impossible for him to secure
work in most other lines. He then entered into the employ of a competitor of
the plaintiff, and now the plaintiff seeks to enjoin him from continuing such
work. Held, injunction denied. The contract is an unreasonable restraint of trade
and therefore unenforceable. Milwaukee Linen Supply Co. v. Ring (Wis. 1933),
246 N.W. 567.

A bargain is in restraint of trade when its performance would limit competition in any business or restrict a promisor in the exercise of gainful occupation.
Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Sec. 513, (1932),' and is illegal if the
restraint is unreasonable. Ibid, Sec. 514; 4 Harv. L. Rev. 128ff (1890). Society
has an interest in such contracts and will protect itself by protecting individuals
who have become parties to such, depriving themselves of individual freedom
and endangering their means to a livelihood. However, reasonable restraints will
be allowed. Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 515; 31 Harv L. Rev. 193 (1917).
The test of reasonableness is less stringent in the case of sales contracts than
in employment contracts, for the vendor is in a better position to protect himself in the sales contract than the employee in the employment contract. 34 Harv.
L. Rev. 555 (1921), but see Eureka Laundry Co. v. Long, 146 Wis. 205, 131 N.W.
412 (1911), in which Vinje, J. says there is no reason for a distinction. The
restraint is unreasonable if it is greater than required for the protection of the
person for whose benefit it is imposed. Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 515-a;
Berlin Mach. Works v. Perry, 71 Wis. 495, 38 N.W. 82 (1888). The restraint
must be qualified as to time, place, and circumstance. Restatement of Contracts,
Sec. 515, comment C: Berlin Mach, Works v. Perry, supra. But such limitations
'In My Laundry Co. v. Schineling, 129 Wis. 597, 109 N.W. 540 (1906), Marshall,
J., stated that evidence that the defendant depended for a livelihood upon work
in the industry from which he is restrained by the contract is properly excluded as being irrelevant. But this does not seem to be the general practice,
for many cases including the present have been decided at least in part on
such evidence.
2 This is one of the first Wisconsin cases in which the Restatement of the Law
of Contracts is cited. Mr. Chief Justice Rosenberry of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court stated before the Milwaukee Bar Association last January, "The propositions laid down in the restatement would, by reason of the carefulness and
thoroughness in which they are made, be accepted as a correct statement of
the law and that anyone who claimed that the propositions there laid down
were not correct statements of the law would have the burden of overthrowing the statement."

